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1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of small and medium scale enterprises cannot be overlooked in the Ghanaian 
economy. Indeed research has established that informal firms can serve as the engine of 
economic development (Beck et al., 2006, Triki et al., 2011). It is estimated that the informal 
sector absorbs nearly 80% of the Ghanaian workforce (Homerku, 1998). These firms usually 
make up the informal sector. The informal sector started growing fast after the structural 
adjustment program which took place in the mid-1980s and led to a large scale retrenchment of 
labour. Government consistent freeze on formal sector employment, private sector inability to 
compete with their foreign counterparts coupled with the relatively low levels of education1 in 
Ghana has made it virtually impossible for the formal sector to fully absorb majority of the 
unemployed persons. Indeed Nyamekye (2009) provides evidence to show that the size of the 
informal sector has grown from being twice that of the formal sector in the 1980s to being five 
and a half times that of the formal sector in the 1990s.  This shows how the informal sector and 
thus informal firms are gradually taking over the Ghanaian economy.  
Over the years, studies have documented many constraints faced by firms especially in 
developing countries including infrastructure, energy, access to markets and macroeconomic 
instability. However, a fast growing literature has revealed financial constraints to firms as the 
most binding of these constraints (Carpenter et al ., 2002,  Guariglia 2008, Beck et al., 2006, Beck 
et al., 2013, Ayyagari et al., 2006, Quartey, 2008). The issue of financial constraints may be 
especially serious for informal firms who may not have been in existence for long and may lack 
collateral. These firms may have two options; formal finance and informal finance. Informal 
finance may require less information to get funds from lenders due to less rigorous information 
requirement but is normally limited in supply and hence, come at a higher interest rate. Formal 
finance on the other hand can help firms overcome financial constraints because of its 
abundance and expert advice on how to manage their firms, but may be difficult for informal 
firms to take advantage of given the collateral requirements. This makes access to finance quite 
complex for informal firms. 
 
Therefore, our interest here lies in examining these interesting but controversial financing 
options available to informal firms. Specifically, this study adds to the recent strand of studies by 
using firm level data on Ghana to examine financing options and how that can impact firm 
growth. We extend the literature by looking at only informal firms that are essential to the 
growth of development of developing countries.  Using different techniques, our results show 
that bank financing promotes firm growth. Our result is robust when we even control for other 
firm characteristics. A policy implication for this study is that Ghana’s economic reform should 
be targeted towards creating a broader formalized financial system that is capable of taking care 
of the needs of the different groups of firms. Hence, apart from the efforts being made by 
government to formalize the activities of microfinance institutions, formal financial institutions 
should be made more efficient. Formalising the activities of informal financial institutions will 
                                                          
1 According to the GSS(2008), 31 percent of Ghanaians who are 15 years and above have never attended school, 55.7 percent 
have basic education while only 13.6 percent have secondary education or higher. 
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not just make it easy for savings to take place but also expose the banks to competition. Also, 
Major steps should be taken to educate the informal sector as to what the requirements of bank 
finance are to enable the informal sector benefit from bank financing. 
We also observe that bank financing has greater impact on large firms compared to small firms 
in Ghana.  
Our results have several implications. First, it provides a strong basis for policy direction. This 
outcome provides government and key stakeholders with an understanding and hence policy 
directed towards promoting  the growth of these informal firms (mainly small and medium scale 
enterprises) as these firms' growth can be a strong vehicle for economic development.  
The right environment and the required initiatives can be created for informal firms to access 
this form of finance. The right environment can include tax incentives to formal institutions who 
lend to a greater number of informal firms, locating branches in regions that have more informal 
firms and making their services accessible to these firms. Required initiatives for informal sectors 
to formally streamline their activities will ameliorate the information asymmetry problems. 
Following these well-directed government initiatives and support, the right platform will be 
created for such informal firms to grow. This study is also in direct response to the current need 
of the Ghanaian economy, as the national consensus from the recently held national economic 
reform  at Senchi 2  highlighted the strong need for the state to encourage and promote 
indigenous entrepreneurship as well as providing further steps to support Small and Medium 
scale Enterprises. 
These findings introduce a policy gap that can help informal firms improve as well as contribute 
to the growth of the Ghanaian economy. Stakeholders, governments should introduce measures 
to improve the relationship between formal financial institutions and the informal sectors. 
Formal financial institutions provide relationship finance which aid the growth of firms in other 
areas aside finance. Their experience over time through working with other firms far exceed that 
of informal finance institutions hence making them a preferred choice for a long term 
relationship finance. Their knowledge about industry survival abilities, surviving start ups and 
many more firm related attribute will indeed be beneficial to the growth of informal firms. 
Alternatively, Government can make use of state owned formal financial institutions to foster 
this relationship. By prioritizing their aims to service the financial needs of the informal sector 
will go a long way to generate the needed contribution from this sector.  
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 explores the data and present some summary 
statistics. Section 3 presents the methodology used for the study. In Sections 4 and 5, we present 
the results and discussion of the results respectively. Section 6 presents the conclusion. 
 
2. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
We use the enterprise survey dataset on informal firms in Ghana conducted in 2013 by the 
World Bank to investigate financing patterns and how they impact informal firm growth in 
Ghana. The survey has information on non-registered business activities which cover most 
SMEs' in Ghana. The survey provides information on 729 firms. Industries covered in the survey 
                                                          
2 This was a three day consensus building by major stakeholders to brainstorm on ways to address the economic issues facing 
Ghana. It was organised by the Ghana government in May 2015. 
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are manufacturing (365) and services sectors (364) 3. Firms captured in the survey are a fair 
representation across the major urban areas in Ghana. Out of the 729 firms, 176 (24%) firms 
were based in Accra, 189 (26%) were based in the North (Kumasi and Tamale), 184 (25%) firms 
were based in Tema, and 180 (25%) firms in Takoradi. The survey questionnaires provide a 
wider range of information about the firms captured. The survey questionnaires cover 10 
sections including sales and supply, finance, business productivity, labour, crime, registration and 
business environment, business general information and ownership, business activity and 
location. These details allow us to also make use of firm size, ownership structure and financing 
types to investigate our main objective. To examine the best form of financing that produces 
higher firm growth, we look at the overall relevance of finance as a constraint for these firms.  
Using information on the constraints faced by firms, we explore the overall finance as a binding 
constraint to firm growth in comparison to the other constraints.  We identified that finance was 
the biggest obstacle faced by informal firms in Ghana. Out of the 8 factors4 highlighted as 
constraints to firm growth, 264 firms (representing 38%) considered finance as their major 
constraint to the growth of business. This was the highest amongst the 8 factors.  In addition to 
this, more than half of all the firms in the data identified finance as constraint when managers of 
these firms were asked if finance was a constraint.5 This confirms that indeed finance plays an 
important role in the smooth running of these firms individually.  
 
       Table 1: regional, sectoral and financing options 
Regions  Frequency Percent 
Accra 176 24.14 
North 189 25.93 
Takoradi 180 24.69 
Tema 184 25.24 
Sector Frequency Percent 
Manufacturing 365 50.07 
Services 364 49.93 
Financing options Frequency Percent 
Internal Finance 618 86.19 
Operational finance 40 5.58 
Money lenders 
finance 
4 0.56 
Microfinance  24 3.35 
Bank finance 12 1.67 
Informal finance 19 2.65 
                                                          
3  Manufacturing sectors include food products, beverage, wearing apparel, leather products, furniture and metal products, 
household (consumer) products, and other manufacturing. Service sectors include communication services, professional services, 
household services, food and beverage services, selling of wearing apparel services, selling of other goods.   
4  The 8 factors identified by the firms were Limited access to finance, Limited access to land, Corruption, Crime, Problems with 
the electricity supply, Problems with the water supply, Limited access to technology, inadequately educated workforce. Out these 
8, limited access to finance, Problems with the electricity supply and limited access to land were the 3 highest factors indicated by 
the firms.    
 
5 Out of 729 firms, 314 firms (53%) indicated finance as a constraint and 278 (49%) indicated finance was not a constraint. The 
other 137 firms had no response for these questions. 
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To examine the relationship between firm financing patterns and firm growth, we explore the 
rich data for the complete view of the financing options available to the firms. There are 6 
different forms of financing used by informal firms in Ghana. Firms make use of Internal 
Finance, Operational finance, Money Lenders, Microfinance Institutions, Bank Finance, and 
Informal Finance6. Of these, internal finance is the most commonly used form of financing. 85% 
of the firms in the survey use Internal Finance. This is acceptable given that firms in the survey 
are all informal firms who may not have the right provision to borrow from formal sources. This 
is a similar phenomenon in other developing countries where predominantly most firms make 
use of Internal Financing compared to alternative options (See Allen et al., 2005; Ayyagari et al., 
2010, Girma et al., 2012, Guariglia et al., 2013). Even with regional analysis, this pattern is 
consistent across all the regions. For Operational Financing, the north has the highest percentage 
of firms who use this kind of finance.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of financing option across regions 
Region 
Internal 
Finance 
Operational 
finance 
Money 
lenders 
finance Microfinance 
Bank 
finance 
Informal 
finance Total 
Accra 156 10 1 3 2 4 176 
North 150 14 0 8 3 4 189 
Takoradi 149 8 0 8 5 8 180 
Tema 163 8 3 5 2 3 184 
Total 618 40 4 24 12 19 729 
  
We also observe that for finance from Money Lenders, majority of Tema firms make use of this 
form of finance, while Takoradi has the highest percentage of firms who use Bank financing and 
Informal Financing options. For Internal Finance we observe a very slight difference across the 
region. Tema firms had a slight majority of less than 2% compared with the other regions.  For 
firm size7, 75 % of the larger firms use more of Bank Financing compared to small firms but 
66% of small firms use finance from Microfinance Institutions. With reference to Internal 
Financing and Operational Financing, 51% of large firms use a little over of Internal Financing 
and 70% of Operational Financing. For Informal Financing, 53% of small firms make use of 
Operational Finance. There is an equal percentage of usage when we looked at money lenders as 
a source of financing across firm size.8   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Informal Finance captures financing from family and friends. Bank Finance covers financing from commercial banks. Internal 
Finance is finance through retained earnings from the business; Operational Finance is finance from suppliers and customer 
trade credit, Money Lenders is finance from business and individuals predominately of the Money Lenders Association Ghana, 
Micro Financing is finance from small size institutions. 
7 Following Zingales et al (2001) Firm size is determined by using the average cost of labour. 
8 We do similar analysis of firm financing across Ownership, firm age and educational level of the largest owner. 
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Table 3: Distribution of financing option across firm characteristics 
  
Internal 
Finance 
Operational 
finance 
Money 
lenders 
finance Microfinance 
Bank 
finance 
Informal 
finance Total 
Firm size   
small firm 48.38 30 50 66.67 25 52.63 47.7 
large firm 51.62 70 50 33.33 75 47.37 52.3 
AGE   
less than 5 years 31.67 17.5 0 37.5 8.33 52.63 31.04 
b/n 5 and 20 years 61.83 65 75 54.17 66.67 47.37 61.52 
greater than 20 years 6.5 17.5 25 8.33 25 0 7.44 
OWNERSHIP   
Joint partnership 10.05 7.5 0 4.17 0 26.32 9.92 
Sole proprietor 89.95 92.5 100 95.83 100 73.68 90.08 
LEGAL STATUS 
       Non registered firms 97.52 100 100 100 91.67 100 97.72 
registered 2.48 0 0 0 8.33 0 2.28 
EDUCATION     
No Education 11.09 28.21 0 8.7 16.67 5.26 11.83 
Primary Education 45.02 38.46 75 52.17 50 42.11 45.07 
Secondary Education 31.32 23.08 25 30.43 16.67 36.84 30.7 
Vocational Training 8.81 0 0 8.7 0 5.26 8.03 
Tertiary Education 3.75 10.26 0 0 16.67 10.53 4.37 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
The empirical model 
We examine the relationship between financing type and firm growth by estimating the following 
model: 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾𝑅𝑅 + 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀                                                                                          (1) 
 
We use log of sales as the main dependent variable (S). More productive firms generally have 
higher sales and higher sales promote firm growth. Therefore, sales of firms are commonly used 
in the finance literature as a measure of firm productivity (eg. Helpman et al., 2004, Helpman et 
al., 2008, Yeaple, 2006). We use different measures of it including average total sales, highest 
total sales, lowest sales, busiest month total sales. We also employ labour productivity as an 
alternative measure. Subscript i represent each firm. Our main independent variable is defined on 
the basis of past financing sources, current financing sources, and financing sources of new 
investment9. First, to capture past financing pattern, we construct a Past Finance Dummy. It 
takes the value of 1 if firm financed day to day operation of the business in the previous years 
                                                          
9 We follow a similar approach by Allen et al., 2005, Ayyagari et al., 2010. 
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with bank loan which represents a formal form of financing, and 0 if financing came from an 
informal source. Bank loans include financing from banks and microfinance institutions. This 
captures the formal financing pattern versus informal financing. This is represented by BF in the 
baseline regression. For robustness, we use different variables to measure our main independent 
variable. We use Bank Dummy as an alternative independent variable which takes the value of 1 
if firm currently has a bank loan. This variable takes on the value of 0 if firm currently does not 
have bank loan.  Alternatively, we also construct another measure which captures how firms 
finance new investment. This variable, Investment Financing Dummy, takes on a value of 1 if 
new investment is financed with bank loan and 0 otherwise. All estimations are done in the 
presence of other control variables (age, firm size, ownership, legal status, level of competition, 
regional dummy) that impact firm growth and productivity. For the dependent variable, we use 
different measures of sales growth. A represents the age of the firm. The Age variable is a 
categorical variable captured in the following order; 1 for firms that are less than 5 years old, 2 
for firms that are between 5 and 20 years old and 3 for firms that are more than 20 years old (See 
Girma et al.,2012, Ayyagari et al., 2010, Guariglia et al., 2011 for similar classification).  LS 
represents the legal status of the firm. It is a dummy variable that identifies firms that are legally 
registered with the state and those that are not. Registered firms are better recognised in the 
goods and labour market compared to the non- registered ones (Christensen et al., 2004). OWN 
captures the ownership structure of the firm.  It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm is a sole proprietor and 0 if otherwise10 (For similar examples, see Xu et al., 2009, 
Shliefer, 1998, Megissons et al.,2001). Firm’s size is represented by FS. For most constraints that 
affect firms’ growth negatively, small-sized firms tend to have greatest slump in their growth 
(Beck et al, 2005). Small-sized firms are likely to be more constrained financially than large ones. 
Following Zingales et al., 2001, we compute the FS variable using labour cost. It is represented 
by a dummy variable that takes on 1 if the firm’s cost is greater than the average labour cost and 
0 if the firm’s labour cost is less than the average labour cost. EDU captures the level of 
education of the largest owners of the firm11. For firms with highly educated managers, it is 
expected that on average such firms will be well managed (Magoutas et al., 2012). In this study, 
we use a categorical variable to represent the EDU variable which takes on the value of 1 if the 
largest owner has no education to 5 where the largest owner has a tertiary level of education. 
Given the current higher power outages in Ghana12, we control for it by including a dummy 
variable to capture it. It takes on the value of 1 if firms identified electricity outages as a 
constraint to their business and 0 otherwise.  It is represented by POW in the baseline 
regression. Also, the more competitive the industrial environment is, the more difficult it is for 
informal firms to survive especially if they are small and young. Thus, we also control for this by 
using a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is located in a city centre and 0  
otherwise.  𝛾𝛾𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼 represent regional and industry specific characteristics that may have been 
omitted.  We first use the Ordinary Least Square estimation technique as a first step to examine 
this relationship. Reverse causality should not be a major issue in this study given that our aim is 
to examine which financing pattern is associated with high firm growth. However, if a firm’s 
ability to obtain finance is influenced by certain firm characteristics such as ownership 
personality (for example education qualification) and these firm characteristics also influence 
firm growth, then there may be issues with endogeneity.  We therefore explore other two 
estimation technique to deal with this. First, we use the instrumental variable technique by 
instrumenting for the Bank financing dummy variable with collateral through Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimation. The firm’s ability to present collateral influences their ability to 
receive financing. However, collateral is not directly related to firm’s growth making it a good 
instrument (Boot et al., 1994, Ayyagari et al., 2008). We use the Heckman selection model as an 
                                                          
10 Because the survey covers only informal firms, the data is dominated by sole proprietor and partnerships. 
11 Primarily, the largest owner has the greatest influence on decision making in the business. 
12 See Asamoah et al., (2014) for a study on power fluctuations on SME’s profitability. 
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additional robustness test. The model is relevant given that bank financing decision by the firms 
may not be random. Sometimes based on preferences, they make the decision to choose a 
particular form of financing. They self-select and hence draws are not random from the 
population but from a specific sample. If this is the case then the estimates from the OLS will be 
biased (Li et al., 2007). The error term will no longer be white noise. 
 
 The Heckman Selection technique involves a two-step approach. In step 1, we estimate a self 
selection equation to draw justification for self- selection. In step two, we estimate the variable 
drawn from the selection on our dependent variable. Following Ayyagri et al., 2010, we estimate 
the selection equation below using collateral as our instrument: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 +
𝛾𝛾𝑅𝑅 + 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼 + 𝜖𝜖 > 0                                                                                                                                    (2)                                                                                                                        
  Equation 2 is our selection model and out of it we obtain the inverse Mills ratio to adjust 
second step of the Heckman model: 
 
𝑆𝑆 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐴𝐴 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛿𝛿6𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛿𝛿8𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅 +
𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 + 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜀𝜀                                                                                                                                               (3)  
Where 𝜃𝜃 is the inverse Mills ratio accounting for the omitted variable bias. 
 
 
4. RESULTS 
Table 4 below presents results from equation 1. We find a positive association between formal 
financing and firm performance.  Across all columns, the bank financing variable (Past finance 
dummy) is positive and also strongly significant for the different indicators for dependent 
variable13. This indicates the relevance of bank financing to informal firms in Ghana. Control 
variables also mostly had the right signs and significant. Firm’s size was positive for all and 
significant in column 2 to 5. This indicates a positive association between firm size and firm 
performance. The bigger firms have a higher growth. We also obtained a stronger relationship 
for education level of the largest owner. This supports the literature on the impact of education 
in work place.  
 
The Age variable was positive and mostly significant indicating that there is positive impact on 
those firms that manage to survive and remain in the industry. Formal registration of the 
business (represented by legal) seems to be beneficial to those firms who had done so. However, 
the impact of competition, ownership and electricity outages were not significant even though it 
had the right signs in some cases.  
                                                          
13 All column of the result table were significant at 1% except column 3 which was significant at 10%. We attribute 
this to the loss of sample due to missing data for average sales variable.   
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Table 4: Firm growth and financing-baseline regression-Past Finance Dummy 
VARIABLES TSMP 
(1) 
TS 
(2) 
ATS 
(3) 
TSSM 
(4) 
TSBM 
(5) 
            
Past Finance Dummy 0.379*** 0.400*** 0.277* 0.512*** 0.380*** 
 (0.114) (0.107) (0.162) (0.117) (0.105) 
Age 0.131 0.176** 0.226* 0.130 0.147* 
 (0.087) (0.078) (0.129) (0.090) (0.086) 
legal status 0.649 0.659* 0.137 0.708* 0.567 
 (0.536) (0.365) (0.393) (0.397) (0.365) 
firm size 0.126 0.210** 0.340** 0.215* 0.319*** 
 (0.116) (0.103) (0.158) (0.113) (0.111) 
Ownership -0.031 0.087 0.083 0.179 0.212 
 (0.155) (0.154) (0.187) (0.166) (0.158) 
Competition 0.031 -0.002 -0.214 -0.115 -0.092 
 (0.100) (0.094) (0.154) (0.103) (0.101) 
education level 0.144** 0.167*** 0.247*** 0.107* 0.180*** 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.083) (0.058) (0.058) 
electricity outage -0.022 -0.072 0.074 0.046 -0.058 
 (0.109) (0.101) (0.163) (0.111) (0.108) 
Constant 5.043*** 5.669*** 5.087*** 5.138*** 5.438*** 
 (0.303) (0.293) (0.423) (0.308) (0.309) 
      
Observations 563 573 256 567 564 
R-squared 0.063 0.095 0.110 0.086 0.088 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include regional and industry 
dummies. TSMP is Total Sales of the Main Product, TS-Total sales, ATS-Average Total Sales, TSSM-Total Sales of 
the Slowest Month, TSBM-Total Sales of the Busiest Month. 
 
 
As robustness, we investigate whether our financing variable is not driving the results. Also, 
given that the Past finance dummy variable was capturing firms and their financing behaviour in 
the past, we introduce two new alternative measures to capture current and future financing 
behaviour. In table 5 we present similar results of equation 1 but with bank finance dummy as 
the financing variable. This captures the current financing behaviour of the firms and establishes 
that our previous results are still robust. As we can see, we obtain similar results. We find a 
positive relationship between bank financing and firm growth. In columns 2, 4 and 5 our result 
for bank financing is also statistically significant. Once again results confirm that formal forms of 
finance were associated with higher firm performance. Alternatively, we use Investment finance 
dummy, which captures how new investment was financed. Results of this estimation can be 
found in the second column of table 5. Our bank financing variable is positive in all cases except 
for column 3.  This is also statistically significant in columns 1 and 2. Confirming our results that 
formal financing options are more relevant to firms in their growth.  
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Table 5: Firm growth and financing-baseline regression-Bank Dummy & Investment Finance 
Dummy 
VARIABLES TSMP 
(1) 
TS 
(2) 
ATS 
(3) 
TSSM 
(4) 
TSBM 
(5) 
            
Bank Dummy 0.150 0.328** 0.226 0.383** 0.310** 
 (0.153) (0.147) (0.206) (0.154) (0.143) 
Investment Finance Dummy 0.077** 0.072** -0.055 0.044 0.040 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.037) (0.044) (0.032) 
      
Controls Age, legal status, firm size, Ownership, Competition, 
education, electricity outages 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include regional and industry dummies. 
TSMP is Total Sales of the Main Product, TS-Total sales, ATS-Average Total Sales, TSSM-Total Sales of the Slowest Month, 
TSBM-Total Sales of the Busiest Month. 
 
 
We also examine the robustness of our results with a change to the dependent variable. We use a 
more direct measure of firm efficiency. Labour productivity growth is used in place of our sales 
variable as dependent variable. We estimate equation 1 using all three indicators of formal 
financing respectively with labour productivity as the dependent variable in each case. From the 
results in table 6, Bank financing is positively associated with higher firm performance. For each 
of the bank financing variables, we obtain a positive relationship.    
 
Table 6: Firm growth and financing-baseline regression-Labour Productivity Growth (LPG) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include regional and industry 
dummies. LPG- Labour Productivity Growth 
 
Our results so far have shown that Bank financing is positively associated with firm 
performance. However, we need to ensure that this is not influenced by the large firms in the 
VARIABLES LPG 
(1) 
LPG 
(2) 
LPG 
(3) 
LPG 
(4) 
     
Investment Finance Dummy 0.079*    
 (0.042)    
Bank Dummy  0.028   
  (0.178)   
Past Finance Dummy     0.281** 
    (0.135) 
Constant 6.372*** 4.361*** 6.372*** 5.501*** 
 (0.462) (0.322) (0.462) (0.342) 
     
Controls  Age, legal status, firm size, Ownership, Competition, 
education, electricity outages 
Observations 237 497 237 498 
R-squared 0.185 0.110 0.185 0.117 
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sample (Beck et al., 2006)14. Like the outliers in the sample of many large informal firms they 
could drive the results. Therefore we explore the relationship between financing and firm growth 
for the respective firm sizes. We estimate equation 1 for large firms and small firms respectively. 
Interestingly, the result from table 7 shows, that our earlier result is robust against any possible 
size effect. We obtain a positive coefficient for all the estimations indicating a positive 
relationship between bank financing and firm performance. A closer look at the coefficient 
estimate reveals bigger estimate for large firms. For example, in column 1, a unit change in our 
bank finance (Past Finance Dummy) will lead to 45% change in firms’ performance all other 
things being equal for larger firms compared to 27% change in firms’ performance. A similar 
pattern is observed in the other columns. 
 
           Table 7: Firm growth and financing-The Size effect 
Large firms  
VARIABLES TSMP 
(1) 
TS 
(2) 
ATS 
(3) 
TSSM 
(4) 
TSBM 
(5) 
            
Past Finance 
Dummy  
0.446** 0.463*** 0.377 0.646*** 0.427** 
 (0.190) (0.175) (0.245) (0.178) (0.171) 
Small firms  
VARIABLES TSMP 
(1) 
TS 
(2) 
ATS 
(3) 
TSSM 
(4) 
TSBM 
(5) 
            
Past Finance 
Dummy  
0.269** 0.296** 0.027 0.340** 0.305** 
 (0.134) (0.132) (0.209) (0.156) (0.129) 
 
 
     
Controls  Age, legal status, firm size, Ownership, 
Competition, education, electricity outages 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include regional and 
industry dummies. TSMP is Total Sales of the Main Product, TS-Total sales, ATS-Average Total Sales, TSSM-
Total Sales of the Slowest Month, TSBM-Total Sales of the Busiest Month. 
 
 
4.1 Robustness tests 
4.1.1 Firm performance and financing options-Instrumental Variable regression 
Despite the robust results evidenced above, there is also a plausible case of endogeneity in the 
relationship examined above. A firm with a good firm performance is more likely to obtain bank 
finance and other forms of finance. If we wish to pursue a causal relationship, then we need to 
address the bi-causal nature of the relationship between financing options and firm performance.  
Furthermore, the presence of other characteristics that can influence a firm’s ability to obtain 
finance and their growth contributes to the issue of endogeneity. As described in section 3, we 
use an instrumental variable technique to deal with this problem.  We estimate a 2SLS regression 
                                                          
14 In a paper by Beck et al., (2006), they showed how the impact of legal and financial constraints on firm’s growth 
depended heavily on firm size. Small firms were greatly constraints by such problems.   
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with collateral15 as an instrument. In table 8, after instrumenting for past finance dummy, the 
result is indifferent to the ones in table 4. We observe a positive sign for our bank financing 
variable in the case of all the 4 different dependent variables. In column 2, 4 and 5, we have 
statistically significant coefficient that are a bigger than that of the coefficients in table 4. The 
magnitude effects are even larger in the estimation. Our results here confirm our earlier results 
are robust and hence formal financing promotes the growth of informal firms in Ghana.16  
 
                Table 8: Firm growth and financing-Instrumental Variable regression17 
VARIABLES TSMP 
(1) 
TS 
(2) 
ATS 
(3) 
TSSM 
(4) 
TSBM 
(5) 
            
Past Finance 
Dummy  
0.215 0.419** 0.375 0.592*** 0.436** 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.249) (0.182) (0.172) 
Age 0.134 0.176** 0.228* 0.129 0.146* 
 (0.087) (0.077) (0.126) (0.089) (0.084) 
legal status 0.634 0.661* 0.146 0.717* 0.573 
 (0.530) (0.362) (0.386) (0.394) (0.362) 
firm size 0.134 0.209** 0.336** 0.211* 0.317*** 
 (0.115) (0.101) (0.153) (0.111) (0.110) 
Ownership -0.022 0.086 0.076 0.173 0.208 
 (0.155) (0.152) (0.182) (0.165) (0.157) 
Competition 0.019 -0.000 -0.208 -0.108 -0.087 
 (0.099) (0.094) (0.149) (0.102) (0.101) 
education level 0.140** 0.167*** 0.247*** 0.110* 0.182*** 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.081) (0.057) (0.057) 
electricity outage -0.018 -0.073 0.070 0.042 -0.061 
 (0.108) (0.100) (0.159) (0.111) (0.108) 
Constant 5.507*** 5.664*** 5.069*** 5.121*** 5.967*** 
 (0.315) (0.290) (0.411) (0.303) (0.308) 
      
First stage F-stat 389.734 443.447 454.341 434.584 389.734 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 563 573 256 567 564 
R-squared 0.060 0.095 0.109 0.085 0.088 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include regional and industry 
dummies. TSMP is Total Sales of the Main Product, TS-Total sales, ATS-Average Total Sales, TSSM-Total Sales of 
the Slowest Month, TSBM-Total Sales of the Busiest Month. 
 
                                                          
15 Collateral is represented by a variable that measures collateral requirement for loan. It captures both personal and 
physical guarantee required to qualify for a loan. 
16 Almost all the control variables had the right signs and significant. 
17 We estimate this for the other two bank financing variables (Bank Dummy and Investment Finance Dummy) and 
result were similar to that of table 5 and 6. However, in the case of the Investment Finance Dummy, the instrument 
did not pass the test of weak instrument. First stage results can be found in the Appendix. 
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   Table 9: Firm growth and financing-Heckman Selection regression 
  TSMP SE TS SE ATS SE TSSM SE TSBM SE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Past Finance Dummy  0.364**  0.417***  0.157  0.477***  0.343***  
 (0.147)  (0.128)  (0.350)  (0.148)  (0.132)  
Age 0.132 0.039 0.184** -0.053 0.342 -0.057 0.145 0.063 0.140 0.008 
 (0.087) (0.120) (0.086) (0.123) (0.372) (0.090) (0.110) (0.122) (0.096) (0.119) 
legal status 0.629* -0.323 0.660** -0.007 -0.928 0.579* 0.883** 0.517 0.716** 0.527 
 (0.330) (0.370) (0.291) (0.426) (2.665) (0.311) (0.410) (0.544) (0.362) (0.542) 
firm size 0.085 -0.710*** 0.291 -0.720*** 0.404 -0.029 -0.108 -0.811*** 0.082 -0.716*** 
 (0.221) (0.156) (0.258) (0.163) (0.351) (0.111) (0.310) (0.163) (0.266) (0.157) 
Ownership -0.032 0.010 0.080 0.065 0.642 -0.290* 0.079 -0.222 0.123 -0.238 
 (0.172) (0.223) (0.165) (0.223) (1.411) (0.172) (0.230) (0.246) (0.205) (0.245) 
 Competition 0.030 0.021 0.022 -0.185 -0.018 -0.102 -0.168 -0.111 -0.120 -0.067 
 (0.101) (0.136) (0.118) (0.140) (0.562) (0.103) (0.134) (0.139) (0.113) (0.137) 
education level 0.138** -0.089 0.178*** -0.084 0.245 0.002 0.057 -0.094 0.142** -0.088 
 (0.064) (0.071) (0.063) (0.072) (0.160) (0.056) (0.082) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) 
electricity outage -0.008 0.228 -0.089 0.145 0.366 -0.151 0.088 0.100 -0.034 0.072 
 (0.125) (0.140) (0.111) (0.146) (0.762) (0.108) (0.137) (0.144) (0.117) (0.142) 
Collateral  -0.550***  -0.332  0.120  -0.182  -0.226 
  (0.204)  (0.222)  (0.174)  (0.231)  (0.223) 
lambda 0.205  -0.428  -2.851  1.513  1.207  
 (0.961)  (1.253)  (6.819)  (1.281)  (1.195)  
Constant 5.458*** 1.645*** 5.686*** 1.821*** 6.870 0.249 5.042*** 1.696*** 5.909*** 1.696*** 
 (0.308) (0.393) (0.291) (0.402) (4.344) (0.304) (0.384) (0.410) (0.333) (0.406) 
           
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include regional and industry dummies. TSMP is Total Sales of the Main Product, TS-Total 
sales, ATS-Average Total Sales, TSSM-Total Sales of the Slowest Month, TSBM-Total Sales of the Busiest Month, SE-Selection Equation. Lambda coefficient captures the effect of 
selection. 
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We examine the robustness of the estimation in table 8. The key variable in the 2SLS estimation 
is the instrument-in this case which is collateral (Colin et al, 2010). If this instruments is not valid 
then the results above is also not valid. Using the first stage F-stat, we test for the weak 
instrument. In all 5 columns, our estimations are valid as the test of weak instrument is 
satisfactorily met.  
 
4.1.2 Heckman selection model 
Selection effect is a likely problem in this study as described in section 3 18. Therefore, we 
investigate the impact of financing options on firm performance again but this time we control 
for selection bias. We estimate the Heckman two-stage selection model using equations 2 and 3 
in section 3. From table 9, the results show that formal financing is positively associated with 
firm growth. Coefficient estimates of the past finance dummy are positive and significant. This 
result improves on the results in table 3 with bigger coefficients for the bank financing variable 
in columns 2 and 4.19 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we explore how our results fit into the literature on financing and firm growth. 
Our investigation reveals that formal finance significantly supports firm growth in the case of 
Ghana. While the data and descriptive statistics showed a predominant use of informal finance 
by the firms captured in the survey, our regression results revealed that formal financing 
promoted firm growth. This result is quite similar to a few studies in this field. In his study on 
Ghana,  Aryeetey (1998) showed that external finance from banks was so essential and was 
indispensable for small and medium scale industries despite the use of internal sources of 
funding. He argued that these informal sources of finance were unstable sources since such 
informal institutions failed from time to time. Delivery of credit by these sources was equally not 
appropriately done. This study was mainly descriptive and therefore our study contributes to the 
literature on Ghana by providing a more detailed analysis of financing and firm growth 
relationship using different estimation techniques and robustness checks. Ayyagari et al. (2010) 
used a similar survey data by the World Bank to show evidence of a positive association between 
bank finance and firm growth in China. Using a series of technique including the Heckman 
selection, they show how bank financing promotes reinvestment rate and productivity growth.  
Similar to Ayyagari et al. (2010), Cull et al., (2005) find that greater access to bank financing is 
associated with higher reinvestment in China. They also explore different external forms of 
financing in the presence of inefficiencies and provide evidence to support formal financing in 
China. Despite these important studies, our study still contributes to the literature with our 
unique way. Our study covered only informal firms in Ghana unlike these other studies20. 
Our results do not completely discard the important role of internal financing on firm growth. In 
our results on firm size, we obtain a positive relationship between firm growth and firm size for 
both large and small firms. However, the coefficient estimate for the small firms was much 
smaller. This suggests the relevance of other sources of financing especially to the development 
of small firms. This result is similar to the study by Girma et al. (2009). They provide evidence to 
                                                          
18 See Li et al. (2007) for a summary and examples of other studies that apply the selection model to control for the 
impact of selection bias on the coefficient estimates. 
19 We estimate the selection model using the bank dummy and investment finance dummy variable and results were 
still consistent. 
20 See Cheng et al. (2006), Fan et al. (2009) for similar results on bank financing and firm growth. 
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support the fact that formal financing has a greater influence on growth of large firms while 
internal finance was relevant to the growth of small firms in China.   
 
 
6. Conclusion  
The focus of this research was to identify exactly which of these forms of financing promote 
firm growth and hence provide a research led policy initiative. Also, given that these two types of 
financing provide unique benefits, identifying which channel operates in Ghana for the informal 
firms would lead to policy recommendations to promote the use of the other channels. This 
outcome will help to identify whether there is substitute or complementary relationship between 
formal and informal forms of financing in Ghana. 
Using firm level data covering 720 informal firms in Ghana, we investigate the relationship 
between firm financing and their performance. We explore the formal financing versus informal 
financing and how they affect firms. Using different estimation techniques and controlling for 
endogeneity we observe that formal finance is positively associated with firm growth. In the 
presence of different measures of firms’ performance and using bank finance to proxy for formal 
finance, we identify that bank finance promotes firm growth especially for large firms. Contrary 
to popular view that informal finance is suitable to SME’s, this result presents a key policy.   
 
These findings can help governments and stakeholders create a suitable environment for the 
general growth of informal firms. Formal finance is generally considered to be a preferred option 
for big firms. But in this study, we have shown that policy makers in developing countries like 
Ghana can boost growth of informal firms by creating easy access to formal finance for informal  
firms. Firstly, Governments in partnership with the bank of Ghana can create incentive that 
encourages formal financing institutions to lend financial support to informal firms. Formal 
finance institutions with several years of experience in financing and working with more firms 
than informal finance institutions can provide more than just finance to informal firms who need 
more education in their financial management and choices. Such support will provide greater 
output and growth sales. Secondly, as policy initiative, government can provide education to 
these informal firms on how to manage their business in such a way to make them attractive to 
formal finance institution to invest. These policy recommendations must be implemented 
together to avoid coordination failure. A state where the formal financial institutions make the 
provision (incentives by government) to accommodate this informal firms equally matched by 
informal firms also making the investment to position their business to work with formal 
financial institutions would prevent the possibility of one group shirking. This is why 
government’s intervention is important. 
 
Another policy recommendation is for government to properly streamline the informal financial 
sector as they are still relevant to the very small firms confirmed by our results. In providing 
support for such sectors to thrive, there should be clarity on regulations governing their activities 
but more important key milestones to monitor their development to improve their support to 
the informal sector. Firms and financial institutions can take up new opportunities when some of 
these obstacles are removed by policy makers. It could also attract new firms to set up in Ghana.  
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First stage results for table 8. 
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VARIABLES TSMP 
(1) 
TS 
(2) 
ATS 
(3) 
TSSM 
(4) 
TSBM 
(5) 
            
Collateral 0.203*** 0.819*** 0.868*** 0.820*** 0.818*** 
 
(0.083) (0.039) (0.052) (0.039) (0.039) 
Age 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.009 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.023) (0.024) 
legal status -0.029 -0.037 0.007 -0.039 -0.040 
 
(0.072) (0.068) (0.107) (0.064) (0.063) 
firm size 0.055* 0.057** 0.050 0.066** 0.064** 
 
(0.03) (0.029) (0.046) (0.030) (0.030) 
Ownership 0.018 0.020 0.037 0.025 0.025 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.039) (0.039) 
level of Competition2 -0.068** 0.70** -0.046 0.073*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.027) (0.027) 
education level -0.021 0.022* 0.014 -0.224 -0.022 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) 
electricity outage 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.016 
 
(0.03) (0.029) (0.048) (0.029) (0.029) 
      Constant 0.203** 0.207** 0.082 0.185** 0.0184** 
 
(0.083) (0.083) (0.091) (0.081) (0.081) 
      Observations 563 573 256 567 564 
R-squared 0.349 0.349 0.109 0.377 0.372 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include regional and industry 
dummies. TSMP is Total Sales of the Main Product, TS-Total sales, ATS-Average Total Sales, TSSM-Total Sales of 
the Slowest Month, TSBM-Total Sales of the Busiest Month. 
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